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Abstract—Accident statistics cite flight crew error in over 60% 
of accidents involving transport category aircraft. Yet, a well-
trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical 
center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety 
component of the entire commercial aviation system. No data 
currently exists that quantifies the contribution of the flight crew 
in this role. Neither does data exist for how often the flight crew 
handles non-normal procedures or system failures on a daily basis 
in the National Airspace System. 
A pilot-in-the-loop high fidelity motion simulation study was 
conducted by the NASA Langley Research Center in partnership 
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to evaluate the 
pilot’s contribution to flight safety during normal flight and in 
response to aircraft system failures. Eighteen crews flew various 
normal and non-normal procedures over a two-day period and 
their actions were recorded in response to failures. To quantify the 
human’s contribution, crew complement was used as the 
experiment independent variable in a between-subjects design. 
Pilot actions and performance when one of the flight crew was 
unavailable were also recorded for comparison against the 
nominal two-crew operations.  
This paper details diversion decisions, perceived safety of 
flight, workload, time to complete pertinent checklists, and 
approach and landing results while dealing with a complete loss of 
electrical generators. Loss of electrical power requires pilots to 
complete the flight without automation support of autopilots, 
flight directors, or auto throttles. For reduced crew complements, 
the additional workload and perceived safety of flight was 
considered unacceptable.     
Keywords— flight crew error, aviation safety, increasingly 
autonomous systems, automation, automation surprise, crew 
complement, reduced crew operations, single pilot operations, total 
electrical failure, raw data approach, hand-flying skills 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal 
factor in over 60% of large transport aircraft fatal 
accidents [1]. Yet, the Air Line Pilots Association 
says that “a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is 
acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft 
systems safety and an integral safety component of 
the entire commercial aviation system” [2]. The latter 
statement, while generally accepted, cannot be 
verified because little or no quantitative data exists on 
how and how many accidents/incidents are averted 
by crew actions. Anecdotal evidence suggests crews 
handle routine failures on a daily basis and Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP) data [3, 4] supports 
this assertion but its data is not publicly releasable. 
Without hard data, the contribution and methods 
employed by pilots to improve the safety of flight is 
difficult to define. Developing ways to augment 
and/or improve a pilot’s ability to contribute to flight 
safety is similarly ill-defined and is hard to 
characterize in the absence of quantifiable data.  
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A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base 
simulation experiment specifically addressed this 
void by collecting data to quantify the human (pilot) 
contribution to safety-of-flight and the methods used 
by pilots in today’s National Airspace System as they 
handled normal and non-normal conditions during 
typical revenue-like flight operations. These data are 
fundamental to and critical for the design and 
development of future increasingly autonomous 
systems that can better support the human in the 
cockpit. Different crew complement configurations 
were tested to gain understanding of the safety 
afforded by having two crew-members on the flight 
deck. Normal two-crew operations were contrasted 
and compared to conditions where the second crew 
member was unavailable when the non-normal 
condition occurred but became re-engaged after 
returning to the flight deck and another case where 
only a single pilot was on the flight deck. This paper 
details preliminary results and analysis of one of six 
non-normal events tested – a failure of both engine 
driven generators. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Crew complement (single pilot and crewed 
configurations) was experimentally manipulated 
during normal and increasingly challenging non-
normal airline operations to quantify the pilot 
contribution to flight safety. 
A. Experiment Design 
The test objectives of the experiment were as 
follows: 
• Establish “baseline” levels of performance 
and safety with nominal two-crew configuration as 
well as collect data to assess the performance and 
safety decrements in reduced crew and single pilot 
crew complements for present-day flight deck design 
and certification and  
• Identify technology requirements from these 
data for increasingly autonomous systems that might 
assist future two-crew operations and eventually, 
enable reduced crew or ultimately, single pilot 
operations.  
To assess human performance and safety, the 
experiment contrasted two-crew operations to 
conditions when one of the pilots was absent from the 
flight deck. If the condition included a temporary 
absence, it was designated as reduced crew 
operations (RCO). If the condition included a 
permanent absence, it was designated as single pilot 
operations (SPO).  
The independent variables were crew complement 
and scenario. The three crew complement 
configurations were: Two-Crew, RCO, and SPO. 
Two normal scenarios and six non-normal scenarios 
were flown over the two days of data collection. The 
non-normal scenarios were grouped into three 
categories (A, B, and C), with two non-normal runs 
in each category. Category A featured failures, 
initially unannunciated, with autopilot available; 
Category B featured annunciated failures with 
autopilot available; and Category C featured 
annunciated failures with autopilot not available. 
Alert type and autopilot state were used to identify 
workload and automation issues (i.e., by availability 
of autopilot) and flight crew awareness and 
monitoring for normal/non-normal operations (i.e., 
alerting). All flights were flown to landing. 
Failures were triggered near top of climb or top of 
descent. This paper details one Category C failure 
that featured a dual AC (alternating current) electrical 
generator failure. Also, the Auxiliary Power Unit 
(APU) was inoperative to increase workload for some 
scenarios and the APU was listed as INOP in the 
flight release and appropriately tagged in the flight 
deck. Reference [5] provides a detailed description of 
the experiment design (factors, metrics, and run 
matrix) and details one other Category C failure.  
The data shown here is taken from 18 nominal 
Two-Crew runs and 18 dual electrical failure non-
normal runs (six SPO, six RCO, six Two-Crew). For 
the RCO configuration, the non-normal started out 
with First Officer flying from the right seat and the 
Captain resting in the left seat, isolated in sight and 
sound from the cockpit. Two minutes after the flying 
pilot signaled for the return of the resting pilot, the 
resting pilot returned to flying duties in the cockpit. 
For the SPO configuration each pilot flew from the 
left seat. 
B. Participants 
Thirty-six pilots (18 crews total), representing five 
airlines, participated in this experiment. Each pilot 
held an Airline Transport Pilot rating and was current 
in the 737-800 aircraft as either Captain or First 
Officer. All participants were male. Crews were 
paired by function (Captain or First Officer) and 
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employer to minimize conflicts in training, standard 
operating procedures, and crew resource 
management techniques. Crews were instructed to 
bring their company’s paper and/or electronic charts 
and 737-800 checklists with them to further reduce 
conflicts in training and standard operating 
procedures. 
C. Simulator 
The research was conducted using the B-737-800 
simulator operated by the FAA AFS-440 at 
Oklahoma City, OK. The simulator is Level D-
certified and can be used for both initial and recurrent 
training. The simulator, although a Level D training 
device, is also fitted with experimental controls, 
modifications, and recording capability to support 
AFS-440’s research mission. The fidelity of the 
simulator and the recording capability were both 
critical to this research effort. 
The test was designed to replicate a normal airline 
operation in today’s National Airspace System. An 
air carrier flight from Denver (KDEN) to 
Albuquerque (KABQ) was used. Dispatch paperwork 
for the flight was provided to the crews and 
constituted the flight release.  
The simulated weather en-route contained 
significant areas of convective activity along the 
Rocky Mountain Front Range and strong northerly 
winds that required a north departure out of KDEN 
before a circuitous route to the west and then south to 
KABQ. This same planned route of flight was used 
for the entire two days of data collection. Weather 
and visibility were designed to affect any diversion 
decisions [5]. 
A live controller and pseudo-pilot(s) were tied into 
the simulation radio in real-time to simulate Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) and some proximate traffic to 
promote realism and maintain realistic pilot workload 
levels. A confederate also served as dispatcher in the 
Airline Operations Center and provided 
communications as necessary and appropriate when 
contacted. 
D. Training 
No additional training was conducted for the 
crews as they were qualified and current B737-800 
pilots and the simulator was Level D-certified. 
E. Procedures 
The crews were briefed on the purpose of the 
experiment and received the dispatch paperwork. The 
crews were instructed to use their company’s 
standard operating procedures and checklists for the 
entire test, including any company dispatch calls and 
cabin crew communications as they would on any 
revenue flight.  
Prior to boarding the aircraft, the crew reviewed 
the paperwork and discussed the flight plan and flight 
conduct. Once they boarded the aircraft, the crew did 
a familiarization check and reviewed the simulator 
safety briefing. Known simulator unique items and 
aircraft differences were identified and discussed 
with the crew prior to run initiation.  
The aircraft initial condition for the nominal run 
was in the hold-short of Runway 35L at KDEN with 
the engines running, parking brake set and aircraft 
configured for takeoff. The Flight Management 
System (FMS) was pre-loaded with the planned flight 
routing and the crews were asked to double-check the 
entries. After review and confirmation of the cockpit 
switches/set-up and completing their normal 
checklists, the crew called KDEN tower for 
departure. 
Following clearance from ATC, the crew flew an 
entire nominal flight from KDEN to KABQ 
following the planned route of flight. The nominal 
flight served as a baseline for “normal” airline two-
crew operations (i.e., nominal data) compared to the 
non-normal runs flown in the RCO and SPO 
configurations. The nominal flight also promoted 
familiarity for the two-person crew interaction during 
the approximately 1.3 hours of flight time required 
for completion. This nominal flight was always flown 
as the first run on Day 1 of data collection for each 
crew.  
III. RESULTS 
This paper details the results for one of the six 
failures studied, a dual electrical generator failure. 
Results from the other five scenarios may be found in 
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. The dual electrical failure occurred 
during the cruise segment of the flight approximately 
15 minutes after starting the run. 
This failure simulated a complete loss of AC 
generators coupled with the APU inoperative. 
Electrical failures are particularly challenging to 
problem solve as they often cause multiple failures of 
ostensibly unrelated systems. Based on dynamic 
current draw and load shedding, systems become 
disabled seemingly at random and produce 
subsequent failures that are temporally disconnected 
from the initial failure event.  
When the generators trip offline, the cockpit 
becomes dark and several alarms trigger before the 
emergency power re-enables a subset of flight 
instruments. The master caution panel is activated 
with up to eight lights since the majority of systems 
have redundant parts that are electrically powered. 
There are twelve main warning lights in total so this 
illustrates the difficulty in troubleshooting electrical 
failures. There are six additional lights that indicate 
loss of both electrical generators. Then there are an 
additional eighteen secondary lights on the overhead 
panel that indicate fuel and hydraulic pumps are off, 
window and pitot heat are off, various cooling fans 
and associated equipment are off, and the 
pressurization system automatic mode has failed.  
None of the secondary issues are covered in the 
primary checklist and require the flight crew to 
understand which of the eighteen lights on the 
overhead can be managed and which ones to ignore 
that are just part of an electrical failure. 
In this electrical failure, the battery supplies only 
enough emergency AC power to operate a subset of 
the flight instruments for a minimum of 30 minutes. 
Some airlines exercise an option for a second battery 
that will supply emergency power for a minimum of 
60 minutes.  
Many systems are offline during a dual electrical 
failure. Traffic, terrain, weather radar, autopilot, auto 
throttle, flight director and right side displays do not 
operate. Left side primary flight display and engine 
displays are available but the pilot has to fly manually 
and operate the throttles for the remainder of the 
flight. One of the flight management systems 
continues to function. The electric fuel pumps fail 
during a dual AC power failure and a checklist note 
indicates “high altitude thrust determination and 
flame out may occur.” Pilots must descend below 
FL250 if all electric pumps are not operating. 
Air-conditioning units called PACKS must remain 
on-line to provide pressurization but load shedding 
can cause high temperature problems which can 
cause the PACKS to randomly trip off-line. The 
pressurization system AUTO FAIL light illuminates 
if the PACKS trip and the system cannot maintain 
pressurization. The outflow valve will close during 
this process. The only way to restore pressurization is 
to switch to manual mode and to bring a PACK 
online. The PACKS will continue to trip offline 
because of cooling issues and will need to be reset 
each time they trip. 
An additional complication for crews requesting 
help from ATC or dispatch was the loss of one radio. 
The crews that did discuss the possibility of calling 
dispatch decided not to because they would have been 
unable to monitor ATC communications during that 
time. 
The boxplots in the following figures show the 
median ratings with the 25th and 75th percentile 
spread in the data, the maximum and minimum 
values, and mean ratings (connected by a line). 
A. Failure Handling and Flight Path Control 
Although total electrical failures are not common, 
they do happen [10]. A dual electrical failure requires 
pilots to hand fly the aircraft to landing including the 
requirement to conduct a raw data approach in the 
weather conditions encountered at that airport. The 
flight director is also failed so the pilots did not have 
any command guidance. Airspeed and altitude 
references (bugs) are not displayed, so the expected 
reminders of critical values were not available. A 
small tick mark is displayed on the airspeed tape 
automatically during approach and is a reminder of 
20 knots above the approach reference airspeed. If 
selected on the flight management system (FMS), a 
green REF cue is provided. All but two crews flew 20 
knots above the approach reference speed all the way 
to touchdown. 
Descending from 36,000 feet within 30 minutes 
requires nearly constant descent. Eighty percent of 
the crews diverted to Denver or Colorado Springs, 
which meant they flew in significant weather and 
turbulence the entire time. Only the pilot on the left 
side had flight instruments and he was required to fly 
the entire time to landing. Thus, the pilot flying was 
already fatigued by the time they had to fly the raw 
data ILS approach. One crew experienced an 
overbank during the descent portion. 
All but one crew, an SPO crew, experienced a 
cabin depressurization and no crew effectively 
managed the cabin altitude during the descent 
portion. No crew reset the PACKs nor did they 
understand that a PACK needed to be online for 
manual pressurization mode to work.  
Flight path control during the approach was 
marginal for all crews. Although crew complement 
was not statistically significant for glideslope 
tracking (F(2,17)=1.12, p=0.352) there was 
operational relevance for this measure as shown in 
Fig. 1, where 0.33 degrees represents one dot of 
deviation on the glideslope scale. In a non-
emergency, one dot would procedurally require a go-
around below 1,000 feet. Localizer tracking, airspeed 
control, and managing descent rate data all showed 
similar trends. For SPO, success depends only on the 
individual pilot. For Two-Crew and RCO 
configurations, the availability of the pilot 
monitoring to coach the pilot flying during the 
maneuver increased success. SPO crews had the 
greatest variability and the glideslope mean 
approached one dot. By the time crews attempted the 
approach, Two-Crew and RCO configurations were 
functionally the same. Both pilots were engaged for 
over 20 minutes in shared operation of the aircraft and 
they both were involved in setting up and conducting 
the approach and landing. Their approach tracking 
performance should have been equivalent as well, yet 
significant variability and degraded performance was 
observed for RCO and the performance degradation 
continued all the way to landing. One SPO crew was 
unstable within 500 feet of the ground and should 
have conducted a go-around but did not. Two SPO 
crews did go around, one because he did not realize 
the flap indication was not powered until the middle 
of the approach and one because they were so far off 
in tracking that they did not have a reliable indication 
(full scale deflection of the instrument). 
 
Fig. 1. RMS Glideslope Deviation by Crew Configuration 
The entire flight is often judged by the landing. 
Table 1 shows landing performance parameters 
separated by crew complement. The B-737-800 has a 
gear distance of 16 feet, so a distance from centerline 
greater than 67 feet would place a tire off the edge of 
the runway. Landing criteria from the FAA Air 
Transport Pilot practical test standards is less than 
3,000 feet from the end of the threshold, on centerline 
with airspeed no greater than 20 knots faster than the 
reference speed. Stabilized approach criteria are 
speed within five knots of the reference speed, sink 
rate less than 1,000 feet per minute and in a position 
to land without significant maneuvering. Jet aircraft 
are certified for landing up to 600 feet per minute 
without damage and sink rate at touchdown must be 
less than this value to ensure no damage to the 
aircraft. Distance from threshold for runways other 
than Denver is not reported due to simulator issues.  
TABLE I.  LANDING PERFORMANCE BY CREW CONFIGURATION 
 
All landings were made at night and the landing 
lights were not operational due to the electrical 
system failure. All crews selected 30 flaps except one 
SPO crew that failed to extend flaps at all and landed 
at 200 knots. The reference speed for flaps 30 landing 
was approximately 140 knots. Crews normally select 
the intended landing flaps value with the flight 
management system and then set the airspeed bug (a 
magenta triangle) to the calculated reference speed 
plus a safety margin based on factors like wind gusts. 
During the electrical failure, the magenta bug was 
inoperative and a small white tick mark is displayed 
as normal at 20 knots above the approach reference 
speed.  
Airspeed control appeared to be problematic but 
still acceptable, with almost all crews flying 20 knots 
above the approach reference speed all the way to 
landing. Only two crews, one SPO and one Two-
Crew, achieved normal stabilized landing speed. The 
one pilot that landed at 200 knots was over the design 
tire speed. One RCO landed beyond the design limit 
(greater than 600 fpm) of the aircraft. The fast SPO 
crew and this RCO crew also exited the lateral 
confines of the runway during the high speed portion 
of the rollout but managed to get the aircraft back on 
the runway prior to bringing the aircraft to a stop.  
 
B. Checklist Usage 
Time to first correct checklist is a metric for 
understanding and solving the problem presented. All 
crews recognized the dual electrical failure and many 
reset the generators before opening the quick 
reference handbook. Timely reference to the 
checklist was important because the checklist 
contained the high altitude thrust determination 
notice, land at the nearest suitable airport, avoid icing 
conditions, and 30 minute battery power limitation.  
Fig. 2 shows time to start the loss of both 
generators checklist. Crew complement was 
significant (F(2,16)=20.36, p<0.001) for both RCO 
and SPO as compared to Two-Crew for this measure. 
The large variability in times for the SPO 
configuration highlight the difficult task of hand 
flying the aircraft while deciding where to divert, and 
to find, open, and read the checklist. Other data from 
this study for failures that left the automation 
available (Category A and B failures) indicated a 
two-minute difference between Two-Crew and RCO 
crew configurations [6, 7]. This Category C failure 
denied automation for the remainder of the flight. 
Here, the mean difference is almost four minutes, 
pointing to additional difficulties for the RCO crews. 
C. Diversion Decision 
Dual electrical failure required a timely divert to 
an alternate airport due the nature of the failure and 
the fact that the aircraft had limited flight time on 
emergency power. Weather was a divert decision 
factor for a number of reasons. Weather radar was 
inoperative so crews needed to rely on ATC to keep 
them safe from convective weather. They no longer 
had icing protection on windows or air data devices. 
The checklist warned them to avoid icing conditions. 
The lower the ceiling during the approach, the longer 
the crew would be required to fly on instruments and 
as the aircraft gets closer to the ground the 
instruments become much more difficult to fly and 
pilots tend to chase the indications. Time to divert 
was significant (F(2,17)=4.23, p=0.035) for crew 
complement, but time pressure influenced the quality 
of the divert decision.  
 
Fig. 2.  Time to Start the Loss of Both Generators Checklist by Crew 
Configuration 
Time to divert (Fig. 3) shows that pilots handling 
this emergency in the SPO configuration quickly 
made a decision to divert but all six SPO crews 
diverted to Denver without investigation of better 
weather nearby. For Two-Crew, the decision was 
delayed but three of six queried ATC  for better 
weather and three of the six landed at an airport other 
than Denver. Note that only the Two-Crew 
configuration found the best diversion airport, Grand 
Junction, with 50% of Two-Crew making that 
decision. For the RCO crews, the decision on average 
was delayed by approximately the two minutes 
before the resting pilot became reengaged. Two RCO 
crews asked for good weather and two crews landed 
at an airport other than Denver, but one crew decided 
to fly to the filed alternate of Santa Fe, which 
produced a time of 48 minutes to land. This crew took 
the longest time to make a divert decision, 25% 
longer than the next longest time and three times 
longer than the mean time to divert. 
 
 Fig. 3. Time to Communicate Diversion Decision to ATC by Crew 
Configuration 
Fig. 4 shows the time to check weather but only 
some crews asked for additional weather information. 
The lower extent of clouds at Grand Junction was 
10,000 feet, 1,000 feet for Santa Fe, and 500 feet for 
Denver and Colorado Springs. This meant that 
effectively the pilots could have been “visual” below 
500 feet with plenty of time to line up on the runway. 
These conditions also limited the length of time in a 
difficult instrument segment when the instruments 
are very sensitive and even more difficult to fly. Two-
Crew took the shortest amount of time to check 
weather and consistently found better weather for the 
diversion airport, with 50% of the crews diverting to 
Grand Junction. 
 
Fig. 4. Time to First Check Weather at Diversion Airport by Crew 
Configuration 
D. Workload 
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX) captured a 
subjective rating [11] (0 [Low] to 100 [High]) of 
perceived task load. There are six subscales of 
workload represented in the NASA TLX: mental 
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, 
performance, effort, and frustration level. The overall 
score results of this measure were examined to 
investigate task load variation. 
Not surprisingly, independent analyses revealed 
significant differences in TLX ratings between the 
nominal and dual generator failure runs for both pilot-
flying (PF) (F(1,34)=40.27, p<0.001) and pilot-
monitoring (PM) (F(1,28)=36.78, p<0.001) (Fig. 5 
and 6). For the dual generator failure runs, pilots rated 
their overall workload as being moderate, as reflected 
in the PF (M=68) and PM (M=63) TLX ratings.  
There were no significant crew complement 
differences for PF overall TLX ratings or PF subscale 
TLX ratings during a dual generator failure run. 
Single pilot operations were rated as having 
moderately high workload (M=74) while crewed 
operations were rated as having moderate workload 
(Dual [M=64], RCO [M=65]) (Fig. 7). 
 
Fig. 5. Overall TLX pilot-flying ratings for dual generator failure and nominal 
runs  
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Fig. 6. Overall TLX pilot-monitoring ratings for dual generator failure and 
nominal runs  
 
Fig. 7. Overall TLX ratings for pilot-flying dual generator failure runs by crew 
configuration 
E. Safety of Flight 
Perceived level of safety was self-assessed using a 
Likert type scale from 1-7, where 1 was completely 
acceptable and 7 was completely unacceptable.  
An ANOVA revealed significant differences for 
PF Perceived Safety of Flight ratings (F(1,34)=26.57, 
p<0.001) between the nominal runs (M=1.3) and the 
failure runs (M=3.4) (Fig. 8). As shown in Fig. 8, 
there was high variability in the overall perceived 
level of safety for the PF compared to normal flight. 
An ANOVA showed significant crew complement 
differences (F(2,15)=4.20, p=0.036) for PF perceived 
safety of flight ratings (Fig. 9). Pilots viewed the 
safety of this failure as unacceptable during SPO 
(M=4.8) where the pilot had to simultaneously 
maintain flightpath control, communicate with 
ATC/Dispatch, and perform checklists.  
 
Fig. 8. Perceived safety of flight ratings for pilot-flying dual generator failure 
and nominal runs collapsed across crew configuration 
 
 
Fig. 9. Perceived safety of flight ratings for pilot-flying dual generator failure 
runs by crew configuration 
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The failure was initiated at cruise altitude over the 
mountains and between two proximate airport 
landing options. Mountainous terrain limited both the 
number of suitable airports available and immediate 
descent options. If crews significantly delayed the 
decision to divert, Colorado Springs was further 
south and became an attractive option. Any crew that 
proceeded to the destination or the filed alternate 
would exceed the 30 minute battery time limit and 
risk significantly reduced instrumentation. Once the 
battery was exhausted only the integrated standby 
flight instrument would remain. This display 
provides required critical flight data but at a reduced 
size which increases difficulty of both normal flying 
and flying an already difficult ILS approach. This 
standby instrument runs on a separate battery with 
150 minutes of life after an electrical failure. 
Ultimately, this failure results in a loss of all 
instruments and the ability to control the aircraft in 
instrument conditions. The majority of the crews 
(80%) quickly decided to divert to Denver, often 
before executing any checklists. SPO crews made the 
decision to divert almost immediately. 
The weather was crafted where the most obvious 
diversion airport was the departing airport, Denver, 
but it had significant weather issues including 
thunderstorms, turbulence, and lower ceilings. A 
visual approach airport was provided in Grand 
Junction but the crews would have to remember the 
weather data from the flight release (multiple pages 
of data), attempt to sort through the pages in flight, 
ask ATC specific questions about the nearest visual 
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conditions, or call dispatch and ask for help. The 
experimental protocol was designed that if pilots 
asked ATC for the nearest VFR weather or airports 
with good weather, ATC was instructed to tell them 
about Grand Junction. This did not happen for two of 
the early runs so the diversion for Two-Crew and 
RCO may have been higher. For the four crews that 
did receive information about Grand Junction, three 
of the crews did divert there. By the time the fourth 
crew collected the necessary information , they were 
promixal to Colorado Springs and it became an 
acceptable option.  
Approach tracking performance variability 
highlights the need for more emphasis on maintaining 
hand-flying ability in general [10] and flying 
instrument approaches with standby instrumentation 
[10, 12] in particular. All crews were unstable at some 
point in the approach below 1,000 feet above the 
ground. Crews are procedurally trained to go around 
but they have command authority above 500 feet. 
Conducting a landing from a marginal but 
salvageable approach was likely considered a better 
alternative than losing the electronic flight display 
during a go around if the battery failed. Some crews 
continued the approach even though the instruments 
were saturated and they could no longer tell if they 
were a little or a lot off. Crews that engaged in 
effective crew resource management techniques, 
such as the pilot monitoring providing the pilot flying 
with directions to fly or early indications of 
deviations, were much more successful than other 
crews or single pilots. It is not surprising that SPO 
had the greatest variability with the mean Glideslope 
RMS error at the go around limit of one dot. Only one 
crew was unstable below 500 feet and crews had 
good centerline tracking on landing. However, one 
RCO and one SPO crew landed near the edge of the 
runway on touchdown, both resulting in runway 
excursions. Airspeed control was affected by the 
airspeed tick mark at 160 knots when the approach 
reference speed was approximately 140 for a flaps 30 
landing, which all crews except one executed.  
Sink rate was excessively high. A number of 
things could influence the high sink rate. First, the 
landing lights were inoperative and all the landings 
occurred at night with overcast skies. Judging the 
flare is difficult. Second, pilot fatigue was likely as 
the pilots were hand-flying for almost 30 minutes 
before executing a raw ILS approach and landing. 
Third, the highest priority during an emergency  
landing is to land. The data shows three pilots, two 
RCO and one SPO, did not flare and landed hard 
enough to collapse some tires on touchdown. Even in 
Two-Crew and SPO configurations where a third of 
the sink rate runs were in the desirable category, most 
of them approached the limit. 
Time to complete the checklist was highly 
variable and is often driven more by ATC 
interaction/interruption than crew configuration. 
Only one SPO crew told ATC to standby when ATC 
interrupted the checklist flow. No crews attempted 
any other checklists except for emergency landing 
and normal descent, approach and landing checklists 
including pack trips or pressurization panel failures, 
despite these being among the eighteen lights 
annunciated on the overhead panel. Most crews 
verbalized expected pressurization issues, but when 
the pressurization panel was checked during the 
initial troubleshooting the bleed air was still 
providing pressurization and cabin altitude was 
normal. Crews commented post-run that, in the actual 
aircraft, their ears would have alerted them to 
pressurization issues before the cabin altitude horn 
would sound. Crews that did try to troubleshoot the 
pressurization problem after the horn sounded still 
did not have a clear understanding of the system 
operation. They would understand the need to select 
manual mode but the outflow valve was already 
closed meaning the reason the cabin altitude could 
not be maintained was not a fault in pressurization 
controller but that bleed was not providing positive 
pressure to the cabin. Earlier detection, alerted by the 
ears, may have improved troubleshooting or provided 
the time to run the checklist. Either way, support is 
needed for effective troubleshooting in time-critical 
and high workload situations. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The data suggests that even two highly qualified 
crew members are challenged by some failures that 
can occur in normal operations. This experiment 
reflects the worst case scenario of a critical electrical 
failure. The APU was inoperative, no automation 
support, limited diversion due to terrain, with poor 
nighttime weather conditions that required a raw ILS 
flight for an approach and landing. But these 
compounding issues are exactly what differentiates a 
failure from an accident. If even one of the conditions 
above had not been present it would have 
significantly reduced the stress and workload of the 
crew during the flight. Although we did not record 
data on recency of hand-flying or instrument 
approach currency using raw data, pilot reported 
number of hours or time/length of employment are 
not indicators of success. One recent new hire first 
officer had some of the best performance and the 
worst performance was exhibited by a high time 
Captain. The industry should continue to stress skill 
maintenance to overcome degradation. One 
manufacturer contends that this is a basic flying skill 
that all pilots should already possess and it does not 
require special training. Although that may be true, it 
is a skill that requires recent practice to be effective 
otherwise the automation must be designed to support 
the pilot throughout these critical failures. 
Although a dual battery option exists, many 
airlines do not exercise that option. When failures 
occur in remote areas, 30 minutes may not be enough 
time and certainly not enough time for a comfortable 
margin. Dual battery or a ram air turbine (RAT) that 
automatically deploys to provide emergency power 
would be advantageous. Although not highlighted in 
this experiment, even if the APU had been available, 
it is not recommended to attempt a start above 25,000 
feet, so there will be some period of time, even with 
a functioning APU where the crew is working on 
emergency power with limited instrumentation.  
Although the statistical power of the study is 
limited with only six RCO crews, there does appear 
to be an interaction with this scenario and the RCO 
crew complement. Time to diversion decision, time 
to check weather, and approach and landing 
performance were all degraded compared to normal 
Two-Crew operations. The other scenarios studied 
showed that even though some issues were noticed 
during the reengagement process, the crew 
interaction after that was comparable to normal two 
crew. There was no detriment to a resting crew 
member after reengagement. In this failure, 
performance degradation was carried all the way to 
landing. Further study of the data or additional studies 
will be required to determine the cause of this 
performance difference. 
Automation support in determining what critical 
systems are affected, what things can be 
reconfigured, and what systems to watch as electrical 
loads may be balanced is lacking. Even though the 
737-800 is an updated version of the classic Boeing 
737, the aircraft flight deck lacks even basic engine 
instrument and crew alerting systems (EICAS), 
synoptic pages or interactive electronic checklists. 
These systems, prevalent on new aircraft types, 
would likely have significantly reduced the workload 
and stress on the crews in handling this emergency. 
Finally, increasingly autonomous systems being 
researched at NASA may provide crews with a better 
understanding during normal and non-normal 
operations. Current-day automation is strong and 
silent yet brittle. It forces the pilot into the pilot-
monitoring role for which the human is not ideally 
suited, especially if there is only one human on the 
flight deck. Autonomy, as opposed to automation, 
robust and chatty, with a delegation of tasks and goals 
from the pilot that can be easily adaptive and 
adaptable is the goal. Autonomy must effectively 
team with the human to keep them in the loop and 
situation aware. The communication modalities that 
pilots use today on the flight deck – natural language, 
gesture, posture, eye gaze, etc – are required by the 
automation if they are to enable effective 
communication with humans without additional 
workload. 
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